

WARFIGHTER 4

AIR INTEGRATION

General. The air integration battlefield operating system demonstrated several strengths including the execution of fixed wing air assets into the division's scheme of maneuver. The majority of close air support (CAS) used at the division level was either XCAS or GCAS, and used, primarily, as a reactionary force. Areas that need review and training emphasis include:

Issue: Player unit and Corps Response Cell were not familiar with theater publications and procedures.

Discussion: Neither the player unit nor Corps response cell personnel had ever researched or read through applicable theater publications regarding airpower. The LOI clearly stressed the need to follow the appropriate theater procedures when employing Killboxes. The Division did publish an annex to their OPORD detailing Killbox procedures that mirrored the theater pub (CFC Publication 3-1.1 Korean Killbox Operations). Had Corps and Division planners studied this pub, it would have saved AOC personnel hours of unnecessary instruction in Killbox procedures. Result: Killboxes management suffered as the Division and Corps struggled to come up to speed on terminology, procedures and graphical requirements

Recommendation: WFX unit and ASOG/ASOS's stress the importance of knowing "theater" procedures for the WFX.

Issue: ASOS personnel received minimal information from Fifth Army related to the exercise prior to their arrival on station.

Discussion: For a guard WFX, no mechanism is in place to ensure the supporting ASOS is included on distribution for LOI's, IPRs, OPORDs, etc, that would allow them some ability to plan for personnel, equipment and supplies needed for the deployment and prepare personnel for the scenario. The late identification of and then lack of travel funding for the ASOS that supported the 49th AD resulted in the ASOS having only one day to study all pertinent pubs, OPORDS, and other documentation prior to the WFX start.

Recommendation: The HHQ of the WFX unit should include its supporting ASOG/ASOS on distribution lists for all available products concerning the WFX. When notified of their support to a WFX, the ASOG/ASOS's should make every effort to arrive at the WFX with as much information as they can get concerning the scenario, theater procedures, schedules, etc.

Issue: No Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) replication in the AOC (personnel or equipment).

Discussion: Army did not fill AF ASOC positional requirements (as per the Simulation Control Plan). Result was that all ASOC functions were "hand waved" making BDA, execution of the ATO/ITO, deconfliction, and clearance of fires issues extremely low fidelity. AOC director had little choice but to execute all missions as planned or asked for in order to just keep the airpower portion of the exercise in play.

Recommendation: HHQ of the WFX unit ensures Sim Control Plan for the AOC is adhered to.

Issue: No Wing Operations Center (WOC) replication in the AOC (personnel or equipment)


Discussion: Army did not fill AF WOC positional requirements (as per the Simulation Control Plan). Result was that all WOC functions (including passing of pilot reports, check in-check out, and 9 line passing) were accomplished by calling in extra contractor assistance. Contractors were untrained and "hand waved" many functions normally executed by WOC personnel just keep the airpower portion of the exercise in play.

Recommendation: HHQ of the WFX unit ensures Sim Control Plan for the AOC is adhered to.

Issue: Over-reliance on DTAC ALO

Discussion: Highly experienced and pro-active DTAC ALO was the "prime mover" in CAS execution. ALO did everything from identifying and choosing the target sets to coordinating missions and calling for SEAD to be fired. Doctrinally, the ALO assists and facilitates in CAS execution by funneling the needed information to the G2, DFSCoord, and G3. Final decision on CAS targeting, SEAD and execution should rest with the G3.

Recommendation: ALOs should not overstep their role as facilitators in the application of airpower. Army units and TACSOPS should be updated and robust enough to reflect procedures necessary to execute CAS in the absence of the ALO (i.e. "What would you do if the ALO was killed?")



Issue: Synergistic effects aid in the division's deep attack.

Discussion: Excellent DOCC planning and integration of joint air assets into the divisions deep attack plan yielded excellent results in both execution and BDA. Overall, the division used FM-90-21 guidance to its advantage throughout its MDMP.

Recommendation: All ASOG/ASOS units become familiar with and integrated well into the Division/Corps DOCC/FECC to ensure deep operations such as these are supported by the necessary airpower to ensure success.

